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Abstract: This study aims to facilitate effective and efficient intersectoral water allocation policy in South Africa, 
where limited water supplies are increasingly constraining necessary economic development. The study 
develops an economic model of irrigated agricultural production that recognises the multi-output nature of 
irrigated agriculture as well as the institutional setting in which commercial irrigation water is allocated in South 
Africa. This model is then used to econometrically estimate the marginal value of commercial irrigation water in 
the Berg Water Management Area (WMA), using a Translog functional form, Tobit censored regression model, 
including controls for heterogeneity, and accounting for heteroscedasticity. The estimates are obtained for 16 
irrigated crops in the region and range from an overall mean of 4.84 R/m3 for peaches to 0.14 R/m3 for wheat, 
but vary significantly between sub-regions and according to soil productivity as well as between crops. 
Furthermore, the estimates differ substantially from the average value of production per m3 of irrigation water, 
reflecting a revenue-water elasticity that differs from unity for all crops. The results imply that there exist 
potential efficiency gains through the intersectoral reallocation of water away from agriculture. A further 
implication is that reallocation within the agricultural sector would be most efficiently undertaken by farmers 
themselves, due to the large number factors that affect irrigation water productivity but are unobservable by 
policymakers or are difficult to account for in the formulation of policy.   
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Introduction  
Water as a Constraint on Economic Development  
The approaching limit to readily available water resources for household, industrial and agricultural users in 
South Africa is placing a constraint on economic development for the country as the processes of 
industrialisation, urbanisation and population growth continue. At a national level, South Africa already uses 
over 30 percent of its available freshwater resources; at 40 percent, it will likely reach the limit for the 
economical exploitation of this resource (Muller, 2013, p.7). At a regional level, around 50 percent of the major 
South African supply schemes were in water balance deficit in 2012. Furthermore, inter-sectoral competition for 
water supply has begun to increase as demand from industry and urban users grows, and as options to augment 
supply to meet growing demand become more difficult and costly. Yet, in the presence of this natural resource 
constraint, there is a national drive to stimulate growth in the economy to alleviate poverty, reduce inequality 
and increase the welfare of citizens (National Planning Commission, 2011). For the country to proceed down a 
path of sustainable and inclusive economic growth, both water and economic policy must adapt to reflect the 
changing dynamics in water resource availability and demand.  
 
This is exemplified in the Berg Water Management Area (Berg WMA), where limited water supplies are placing 
a forcing difficult economic trade-offs. Specifically, the National Development Plan (NDP) has identified Saldanha 
Bay as an area of strategic economic growth and infrastructure development through an Industrial Development 
Zone (IDZ), including a port and industrial hub. The planned developments in Saldanha Bay are expected to 
generate much needed economic growth and job creation in Saldanha Bay and surrounding areas, but will lead 
to increased demand for water. Saldanha Bay, however, draws its fresh-water supplies from the Berg WMA, in 
which all readily available water has already been fully allocated to existing users. 
 
Policy Disconnect  
Despite the constraint being placed on economic development by constrained water supplies, there currently 
exists a general disconnect between the planning for water resources and economic development in South 
Africa. Both tend to treat the other as exogenous factors in their planning process, and this can lead to conflict 
between policymakers and stakeholders (GreenCape, 2015). The failure to recognise the dependence of 
economic development on water resources, and the resulting failure to coordinate economic and water policy, 
leads to the inefficient allocation of scarce water supplies. If not addressed, this is likely to increase the constraint 
water places on economic development and poverty alleviation in the future. 
 
In the Berg WMA, the policy disconnect has resulted in local planners in Saldanha Bay favouring water resource 
interventions that are not supported by national government, nor by industry. The local municipality in Saldanha 
Bay has proposed a desalination plant to augment water supply – a proposal not supported the Department of 
Water and Sanitation (DWS) nor local industry (GreenCape, 2015). In addition, there has been no investigation 
into the full costs and benefits of potential policy interventions.  
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The result of the disconnect between water resources and economic development planning, as well as increasing 
fiscal constraints for both local and national government, is that the development of additional water supply 
infrastructure to supply the Berg WMA is likely to be preceded by an increase in water demand from the planned 
developments of the Saldanha Bay IDZ. In the short- to medium-term, water demand in Saldanha Bay will exceed 
water supply and this may result in economic development being constrained in the area (GreenCape, 2016).  
 
Policy and Economic Principles  
In a situation of a fixed water supply constraint and intense competition for water, an important objective of 
water allocation policy is to allocate the available water resource to those agricultural, residential, industrial, 
recreational or environmental, and other uses in such a way as to make the most productive use of water 
available for these purposes (Ward & Michelsen, 2002). Specifically, the economically efficient allocation of 
water occurs when the marginal benefit from the use of water is equal across users, or sectors (Dinar, Rosegrant 
& Meinzen-Dick, 1997, p.4). If not, the allocation will not be Pareto efficient, since society would benefit by 
allocating water to those uses that generate the highest marginal benefit from water, up to the point where the 
marginal benefit is equal to the marginal benefit in alternate uses. In terms of water policy, this implies that 
policies will improve economic efficiency when they reallocate water between users if the marginal benefit 
gained by the gainer exceeds the marginal benefit lost by the loser. In other words, the marginal benefit should 
exceed the opportunity cost of the reallocation. 
 
The objective of achieving economically rational water policy is set out in in the National Water Act (1998), which 
recognises the need to establish suitable institutions to protect social and economic development through the 
use of water. Specifically, Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) are established under the Act and tasked 
with designing allocation strategies for each major catchment in South Africa (National Water Act No. 36, 1998, 
Chapter 7). These allocation strategies must consider the “efficient and beneficial use of water in the public 
interest” as well as the “socio-economic impact” of water allocation decisions (National Water Act No. 36, 1998, 
Section 27).  
 
In the short-term, it may be economically rational to meet the water demands of the Saldanha Bay IDZ through 
a reallocation of existing supply in the Berg WMA. The National Water Act (1998) sets the legal framework 
through which policymakers could implement such a reallocation of water resources. In the context of the Berg 
WMA and the proposed Saldanha Bay IDZ, two provisions in the Act are particularly relevant. First, the 
reallocation of water supply between existing and new water users is possible in regions experiencing water 
stress, such as the Berg WMA, through a process called “compulsory licensing” (National Water Act No. 36, 1998, 
Chapter 4). Second, priority is given to “water use of strategic importance” in the Act (National Water Act No. 
36, 1998, Section 6-1) This implies that water can allocated to strategic projects, such as the Saldanha Bay IDZ, 
before the remaining supply is allocated between other municipal, industrial and agricultural users.   
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Such a reallocation will only be a Pareto improvement if the marginal benefit of the water transferred to the 
Saldanha Bay IDZ is greater than, or equal to, to opportunity cost of the transfer. Furthermore, if such a 
reallocation is to result in a welfare improvement, the water will need to be reallocated at the minimum possible 
opportunity cost – that is, from the existing water uses in the Berg WMA that generate the lowest marginal 
benefit from water use. In sum, policymakers will need to decide whether it is optimal to meet the demands of 
the Saldanha Bay IDZ through reallocation, and if so, how the reallocation should occur so as to minimise the 
opportunity cost of the reallocation.  
 
In the longer-term, the decision on whether to invest in supply augmentation infrastructure for the purposes of 
supplying the IDZ should also be guided by economic efficiency criteria. Thus, the marginal cost of supplying 
water through an augmentation project (such as a desalination plant) will need to be less than, or equal to, the 
lowest marginal benefit from water generated by existing users in the Berg WMA. If this condition is not satisfied, 
then it will be optimal to instead meet the water requirements of the IDZ by reallocating existing supply at the 
minimum opportunity cost.  
 
It follows that a necessary condition for policymakers in the Berg WMA to make short- and long-term water 
supply and allocation decisions is knowledge of the minimum water opportunity cost of the Saldanha Bay IDZ. If 
well-functioning markets for water existed, policymakers would be able to use the market price for water as 
representation of its marginal value - a hypothetical well-functioning water market would allocate water 
resources to activities yielding the greatest marginal benefit for water, and the price paid for water would also 
represent the marginal value of water in that use.1 However, since there are high costs associated with capturing 
and holding water and water supply is subject to a regular stream of unexpected changes, it is typically expensive 
or impossible to define, establish and enforce the property rights required for a well-functioning water market 
(Ward, 2007).  As such, well defined institutions that could serve to efficiently allocate water are typically lacking; 
this is the case in South Africa where commercial agricultural water is institutionally allocated. Since price 
provides a poor guide to the marginal value of water in the absence of effective markets, policymakers must 
base policy decisions on an estimate of the marginal value of water to alternate users in a given catchment.  
 
Sectoral Focus  
The a priori expectation is that an economically rational reallocation of water supplies in the Berg WMA is likely 
to result from a reallocation of water away from the agricultural sector and towards industrial users, such as 
those in the Saldanha Bay IDZ. This expectation is primarily guided by estimates of the value of water in different 
sectors from previous studies, presented in Tables 1 and 2. The estimates suggest that the Industrial sector 
generates the greatest benefit from water use, followed by eco-tourism, mining and municipal use, whilst 
agriculture appears to generate the lowest marginal benefit from water use according to estimates by Conradie 
(2002), Williams et al. (2008), and Coningarth Consultants (2001) amongst others. Furthermore, agriculture is 
                                                                
1 This is a result of the assumption that a rational agent would purchase additional water until its marginal cost 
(price) equals its marginal benefit 
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the largest sectoral user of water - using 60 percent of the total national allocation (Department of Water Affairs, 
2013). Thus, a small proportional reallocation of agricultural water would result in a large absolute reallocation 
of water supply. This suggests that a water reallocation policy in the Berg WMA should focus on the agricultural 
sector as the source of reallocation, as the largest and least efficient water user in the region.2 
 
In addition, the estimates in Table 2 suggest that the value of agricultural water varies considerably between 
studies and regions. Thus, policymakers in the Berg WMA should make use of estimates of the marginal value of 
irrigation water derived from a local study if the estimates are to be accurate and reliable. Furthermore, within 
regions the range of estimates is also large - in the Berg WMA, Louw (2002) estimates that the value of irrigation 
water can range between 0 to 5.99 R/m3, with a median value of 0.48 R/m3, at 2015 price levels. The variability 
in water values may be due to differences in crops grown, to differences in soil, or climatic conditions, to farming 
and irrigation practices, or some combination of these factors. A reallocation policy therefore requires an 
understanding of the sources and implications of this variation in the marginal benefit of water within the 
agricultural sector if a reallocation of agricultural water is to be economically optimal.  
                                                                
2 It is worth noting, however, that the estimates presented do not account for the full value chain of output 
from the various industries. Accounting for these multiplier effects will likely result in higher marginal benefit 
estimates for water across the sectors.  
Table 1: Water Value Estimates for Non-agricultural Sectors 
Study Sector Method Type of Estimate 
Estimate 
(R/m3) 
2015 Price 
Level a 
Conradie (2002) Municipal  
Demand 
Function 
Marginal Value 2.4 5.71 
Williams et al. (2008) Municipal  
Contingent 
Valuation 
Willingness to Pay 2.22 3.29 
Coningarth 
Consultants (2001) 
Industrial Input/Output Average Value 157.4 340.57 
Mining Input/Output Average Value 39.5 85.25 
Eco-
Tourism 
Input/Output Average Value 44.4 96.07 
a For comparability, original estimates are inflated to 2015 price level using the Consumer Price Index 
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Objectives 
This study forms one portion of a broader research project entitled Towards Sustainable Economic Development 
in Water Constrained Catchments. The aims of this broader project are to develop a policy planning approach 
that recognises the interdependency of economics and water resources, to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
proposed economic developments and water resource interventions relating to the Saldanha Bay IDZ, and build 
a hydro-economic model to manage regional water allocation in the Berg WMA - with the intention that the 
processes and outcomes from the research project can be applied in other constrained catchments in South 
Africa. 
 
The purpose of this study is to contribute towards the economic analysis undertaken in the broader WRC 
research project. In line with this purpose, the objectives of the study are threefold. First, the study aims to 
establish the marginal value of agricultural water in the Berg WMA. Recognising the heterogeneity of previous 
estimates, the study will aim to estimate separate values of irrigation water for the major irrigated crops in the 
region as well as to incorporate location-specific heterogeneity into the estimates. The estimates will serve to 
guide policymakers in making economically rational intrasectoral water reallocation decisions. 
 
The second objective of the study is to develop an econometric basis for estimating the marginal value of water 
to agriculture in constrained catchments in South Africa. The methodology is therefore developed so as to allow 
similar studies to be conducted in other regions using the model and methods of this study. 
 
Third, the study aims to advance and facilitate a push for public policy that efficiently allocates scarce water 
resources and minimises the constraint on economic development imposed by limited water resources. This 
requires that policy surrounding economic development and water resources are taken in accordance with 
economic principles of efficiency and Pareto optimality and may require the consideration of policies that 
encourage the intersectoral reallocation of existing water supplies. 
Table 2: Agricultural Irrigation Water Value Estimates from Previous Studies 
Study Area Method Type of Estimate Estimate (R/m3) 2015 Price Levels a 
Conradie (2002) 
Fish-Sundays River 
Scheme Linear Programming Marginal Value 0 - 0.35 0 - 0.82 
Louw (2001) Berg River Basin  
Positive Mathematical 
Programming Marginal Value b 0 - 2.52 0 - 5.99 
Williams et al. (2008) 
Letaba River 
Catchment  
Contingent Valuation 
Method 
Willingness to 
Pay/Marginal Value 0.86 
1.28 
Hosking et al. (2002) 
Tsitsikamma 
Catchment 
Contingent Valuation 
Method 
Willingness to 
Pay/Marginal Value 0.125 0.29 
Olbricht and Hassan 
(1999)  
Crocodile River 
Catchment  - Net Terminal Value 1 - 10.9 2.56 - 27.95 
Hassan (2003) Mpumalanga Quasi-Input-Output Direct Value Added 0.92 - 2.76 2.35 - 7.08 
Conningarth 
Consultants (2001) South Africa Input-Output Average Value 1.5 3.25 
a For comparability, original estimates are inflated to 2015 price level using the Consumer Price Index 
b Louw (2001) reports capitalised marginal values. Reported estimate is annual marginal value based on authors own calculations and 20 year 
horizon and a discount rate of 13%, as used by Louw (2001) 
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Methodology  
Introduction  
When water is an intermediate good in production, the demand for water is derived from its use in producing a 
final product. In agricultural production, the marginal economic benefit of water allocated to irrigation is 
quantified as the change in the value of agricultural products less changes in associated production costs. 
Therefore, methods that value irrigation water typically involve measuring the response of agricultural 
production due to a change in irrigation water applied (Ward & Michelsen, 2002, p.435). In order to accurately 
measure this relationship, it necessary to account for any factors that might have an independent effect on 
agricultural production. These include the levels of other inputs such as cropland, fertilizer and pesticides, and 
farm labour and capital. They further include conditions under which production takes place such as soil fertility, 
climate, production intensity and other management practices, and institutional settings and market conditions.  
 
In order to meet the objectives of this study, two methodological considerations must be acknowledged. First, 
if the methodology of the study is to be adapted and applied in other water constrained catchments in South 
Africa, the methodology must make use of publicly-available data or data that is generated in the broader WRC 
research project. The most comprehensive source of publicly available data on agricultural production is the 
Census of Commercial Agriculture, conducted periodically by Statistics South Africa. The census reports annual 
figures on crop-level production values and area of planted cropland for irrigated agriculture at a regional level. 
However, the census does not report crop-level figures for other production inputs. Additionally, as part of the 
WRC research project, crop-level irrigation water requirements have been estimated for regions constituting the 
Berg WMA. Thus, the methodology is limited to estimation using two agricultural inputs - area of planted 
cropland and irrigation water requirements, a proxy for actual irrigation use  
 
Second, according to the National Water Act (1998), commercial agricultural irrigation water is controlled 
through institutionally issued water licenses, which specify a quota of irrigation water that an agricultural entity 
may extract in a given period. The price charged for this irrigation water is institutionally determined, and is 
charged on the basis of the agricultural entity’s licensed quota rather than the amount of irrigation water 
actually used. As such, commercial irrigation water in South Africa is not price-rationed, since it represents a 
fixed cost to an agricultural producer. Furthermore, quotas on irrigation water impose farm-level water 
constraints on irrigated agricultural production in South Africa.  
 
A Model of Irrigated Agricultural Production  
Agricultural producers engaged in irrigated production are required to make a variety of production decisions, 
including crop-choice, land allocation, and irrigation water application. Farmers engaged in irrigated agriculture 
are typically multi-output producers: they choose from a set of irrigated crops commonly grown in the region, 
and generally grow two or more crops, but not necessarily all crops in the choice set. In addition to a discrete 
choice on the set of irrigated crops to produce, the producer must decide on the quantity of cropland to allocate 
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to each of these crops. These decisions are modelled as relatively long-run decisions, since they are either 
impossible or prohibitively costly to alter within a production season (Moore, Gollehon & Carey, 1994, p.860).  
 
In addition to the crop-choice and land allocation decisions, the producer must make crop-level irrigation water 
application decisions; these decisions are conditional on the crop-choice and land allocation decisions. 
Additionally, crop-level irrigation is supplementary in most cases and, therefore, responds to short-run climatic 
conditions over the growing season. Thus, the irrigation water application decision is a short-run decision made 
within the irrigation season. As such, the appropriate model for analysing the relationship between agricultural 
production and irrigation water application is that of short-run multi-output production (Just et al., 1990; Moore, 
Gollehon & Carey, 1994; Moore, Gollehon & Carey, 1994).  
 
Basic Assumptions  
The model applies the theory of a multi-output competitive firm to an agricultural entity engaged in irrigated 
production. The agricultural producer is assumed to maximise multi-output short-term restricted profits within 
the irrigation season by optimally allocating variable inputs across all irrigated crops grown (Just et al., 1990).  
Inputs are assumed to be technically non-joint in production; this assumption implies that there is no 
technological interdependence between crops and enables the characterization of crop-level production and 
profit functions (Shumway, Pope & Nash, 1984, p.73). Finally, agricultural producers are assumed to be perfectly 
competitive, and therefore price takers in both input and output markets. Therefore, farmers optimise 
production decisions conditional on exogenous expected input and output prices.  
 
Composite Input  
In the short-run, crop-level irrigated production is largely determined by the quantity of crop-land with irrigation 
infrastructure allocated to that crop. Following the approaches of Moore (1999), Just et al (1983) and Just et al. 
(1990) among others, the crop-level land allocation is modelled as a composite input. The composite input is 
assumed to be composed of land, capital, and variable inputs (other than irrigation water).  
 
The assumption that cropland represents a composite input is based on the hypothesis that farmers make short-
run decisions around variable inputs in accordance with satisficing behaviour (Simon, 1965; Nelson & Winter, 
2009). Satisficing behaviour is intuitively based on the premise that longer-run decisions have a larger 
quantitative impact on profit relative to short-run decisions; whilst in the long-run producer behaviour might be 
best approximated by profit maximization, in the short-run following a rule-of-thumb, following a distributers 
guideline, or mimicking neighbouring farmers with regards to the level of variable inputs applied to crops may 
conserve on information requirements with little sacrifice to profits (Moore, Gollehon & Carey, 1994). If short-
run production decisions are taken in accordance with satisficing behaviour, levels of capital and variable inputs 
are determined by the area of land under cultivation. These inputs are applied to a particular crop in proportion 
to the amount of land allocated to that crop, with the proportion variable across crops. 
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The assumption that crop-land represents a composite input has found empirical support in studies by 
Hornbaker et al. (1989) and Just et al. (1983). Hornbaker et al. (1989) find cropland to be the main element in 
production plans of farmers - farmers base their production plans on variable input/land ratios which are derived 
from rules of thumb, by mimicking other farmers, or from guidelines supplied to farmers by various 
organizations. Thus variable inputs are largely applied in proportion to the planted crop-land. Just et al. (1983, 
p. 778) find that capital inputs such as tractors and equipment tend to be in excess capacity on many farms, and 
thus do not limit production decisions for farmers. Irrigation infrastructure represents a major capital input, but 
is allocated to each crop in amounts proportional to the land used. Thus, the effect of capital on production can 
be assumed to be reflected in the land coefficient. Labour input is less clear, but labour employed prior to harvest 
is likely to be proportional to land. Labour employed during the harvest period, on the other hand, is assumed 
to have little effect on the production decision as it is simply used to supplement existing labour so that no crop 
is left unharvested. Thus, any labour effects in the production function can be assumed to be captured in the 
land coefficient in the production model. 
 
Quasi-Fixed Water Input 
Modelling irrigation water as a fixed, allocable input (or quasi-fixed input) reflects the institutional setting of 
commercial irrigation water in South Africa. The model implies that multi-crop producers face a fixed farm-level 
quota for irrigation water over a specified period, and must allocate this water between crops optimally so as to 
maximise total farm income. Thus, the irrigated agriculture farm faces a constrained optimization problem.  
 
In considering the appropriateness of the characterization of irrigation water use as a quasi-fixed input, one 
should note that it is not clear that commercial agriculture irrigation quotas are closely monitored, nor regularly 
enforced, in South Africa. It may be a concern that, although theoretically and legally water use is capped at the 
licensed amount, this is not the case empirically. However, there is also reason to believe that agricultural 
producers do adhere to their quotas, despite a lack of monitoring and enforcement; agriculture requires a high 
degree of supply assurance for irrigation water, particularly in the case of crops such as orchards and vineyards 
that represent a long-term investment. Risk-averse farmers are unlikely to make long-term crop-choice and land-
allocation decisions that rely on extraction of irrigation water above the legal allocation since access to this water 
comes with a far lower assurance of supply. This is a particularly relevant concern in a region in which water 
supplies are already constraining, such as the Berg River WMA. In the short-run farmers may be inclined to 
extract water above the level of their quota, but this is likely to be limited by some degree of peer monitoring 
within farming communities.3 
 
                                                                
3Furthermore, three studies - Kanazawa (1993), Moore and Dinar (1995), and Moore (1999), found that 
surface irrigation water is a quantity rationed input in American agricultural production. Since irrigation water 
is institutionally allocated to both American and South African commercial farmers, this suggests that surface 
irrigation water may be quantity rationed in South African agriculture as well. 
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An important modelling implication arises from the presence of a quasi-fixed input in a multi-output setting: 
joint production is introduced, despite the assumption of technically non-joint inputs. Production will be joint 
because the quasi-fixed input in constraining, implying that crops compete for irrigation water allocations. 
Apparent joint production still allows for the identification of individual production processes, but constrains 
the production of each individual crop to be dependent on the prices of all other irrigated crops grown by the 
producer (Shumway, Pope & Nash, 1984, p.76). This provides a statistical test for the presence of a quasi-fixed 
input; if the prices of other crops are found to be statistically significant determinants of crop-level production 
decisions, this implies joint production (Shumway, Pope & Nash, 1984, p.74). Under the assumption of 
technically non-joint inputs, statistically significant cross-price effects would imply the presence of a quasi-fixed 
input.4  
 
General Form Model  
Within the irrigation season, the multi-output agricultural enterprise engaged in irrigated production allocates 
a quasi-fixed irrigation water endowment between all irrigated crops grown, conditional on a fixed composite 
input. Therefore, the producer’s optimisation problem is one of revenue maximisation; the short-run objective 
of the agricultural producer is to maximise multioutput revenue, subject to the total farm-level water constraint 
(Chambers, 1988; Moore, 1999). Thus, a revenue function (Chambers, 1988, pp.262-66) relating multioutput 
revenue to a fixed input endowment, is defined for the agricultural producer as:  
𝑅(𝒑, 𝑐1 … 𝑐𝑚 , 𝑊 ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤1… 𝑤𝑚
 [∑ 𝑟𝑖(𝑤𝑖 ; 𝑐𝑖 , 𝒑 ) ∶  ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
= 𝑊
𝑚
𝑖=1
] ,      𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚                                                        (1) 
where 𝑅(∙) is overall (multioutput) farm revenue, 𝑊 is the farm-level water constraint, 𝒑 is a vector of irrigated 
crop output prices, 𝑟𝑖(∙) is the crop-level revenue for crop 𝑖, 𝑤𝑖  is the irrigation water allocated to crop 𝑖, 𝑐𝑖  is 
the composite input allocated to crop 𝑖, and 𝑝𝑖  is the output price for crop 𝑖.  
 
Following Squires and Kirkley (1991, p.113) and Moore (1999, pp.564-65) equation (1) can be used to derive the 
shadow price (marginal revenue) functions for the quasi-fixed water input endowments as: 
 
𝑑𝑅(∙ )
𝑑𝑤𝑖
=
𝜕𝑟𝑖(𝑤𝑖 ; 𝑐𝑖 , 𝒑 )
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 𝜆(𝒑, 𝒄, 𝑊),    ∀ 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑚                                                                                                      (2) 
 
The shadow price function, 𝜆(∙), derived in equation (2) represents the marginal change in the value of 
agricultural output that would result from an incremental change in the volume of water available for irrigated 
agricultural production. If the farmer is optimising production effectively, the shadow price of irrigation water 
will be equal across all crops grown and the farm-level allocation of irrigation water will be Pareto optimal. The 
                                                                
4 Should the prices of other crops be found to have a statistically insignificant effect on crop-level production 
this would imply that irrigation water is applied according to some other model of input application. Since 
water is not price rationed, the standard variable input model does not apply. However, irrigation water may 
also be applied according to satisficing behaviour. 
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crop-level revenue function 𝑟𝑖(∙ ) can be estimated econometrically, following which the irrigation water shadow 
price function can be estimated according to equation (2). 
Empirical Application  
Crop-level revenue functions are estimated via regression analysis for 16 irrigated crops in the Berg River WMA, 
using data from the 16 magisterial districts5 that make up the catchment for the three years 1993, 2002 and 
2007. The estimated parameters from the revenue function are then used to estimate the marginal value of 
irrigation water for the different crops analysed.  
Data  
Data on crop-level gross farming revenue, area of irrigated cropland (representing the composite input), and 
number of farms were obtained from the Census of Commercial Agriculture for the three most recent years 
available (1993; 2002; 2007). The data aggregates the values from all farms at the magisterial district level and 
covers 16 major irrigated crops common to the region. The full list of crops covered can be seen in Table 4, 
below, and an illustrative example of the distribution of irrigated cropland for Paarl in 2007 is shown in Figure 
1, below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
5 The Berg WMA supplies irrigation water to producers in seven local municipalities, which can be further 
differentiated into 16 magisterial districts. Table 3 gives a breakdown of the geographical coverage of the region.  
Table 3: Geographic Coverage  
Local Municipality Magestaerial District  
Bergrivier Piketberg 
City of Cape Town 
Bellville 
Kuilsriver 
Simon's Town 
Somerset West 
Strand 
Wynberg 
Drakenstein 
Paarl 
Wellington 
Saldanha 
Hopefield 
Vredenburg 
Stellenbosch Stellenbosch 
Swartland 
Malmesbury 
Moorreesburg 
Witzenberg 
Ceres 
Tulbagh 
Table 4: Crop Coverage  
Category Crop 
Field Crops  
Wheat 
Lucerne 
Citrus 
Fruits 
Oranges 
Lemons 
Naartjies 
Deciduous 
Fruits 
Apples 
Pears 
Peaches 
Viticulture 
Table Grapes 
Wine Grapes 
Vegetables 
Potatoes 
Tomatoes 
Onions 
Pumpkins  
Carrots 
Cabbage 
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Data on annual crop prices are obtained from the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (Department of Agriculture 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2013). One year lagged values for output prices were used and, therefore, represent 
expected output prices. Expected output prices are the relevant prices since farmers make crop-choice and land-
allocation decisions prior to the output price being realized (Moore & Negri, 1992).  
Additionally, a set of soil and climatic variables were obtained from the Land Degradation in South Africa dataset 
(Hoffmann et al., 1999). These include a soil average slope and percentage of rainfall falling within the summer 
months, as well as a soil fertility index, soil erosion index and summer aridity index – all at the magisterial district 
level. These variables are listed and defined in Table 5, below. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Soil and Climatic Variables 
Variable Definition  Units 
Average Slope Mean percentage change in altitude over a 1'x1' latitude and longitude grid surface Percentage 
Soil Erosion Index determined by slope, soil type, rainfall intensity and land use Index 
Soil Fertility Index A function of the clay content and base status of the soil Index 
Rainfall Seasonality % of rain falling in the summer months (October to March) Percentage 
Summer Rainfall Defined as the sum of the mean precipitation for the four hottest months of the year mm 
Source: Land Degradation in South Africa (Hoffman et al, 1999) 
Note: All variable defined at the magisterial district level 
Maize
0,11%
Potatoes
6,12%
Tomatoes
1,60%Onions
0,01%
Pumpkins
0,01%
Carrots
0,84%
Cabbage
0,55%
Oranges
1,92%
Lemons
0,96%
Naartjies
0,91%
Apples
1,83%
Pears
3,16%
Peaches
1,06%
Table Grapes
10,74%
Wine Grapes
70,18%
Figure 1: Hectares of Irrigated Cropland for Paarl 2007
Source: 2007 Census of Commercial Agriculture, Statistics South Africa 
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Actual annual irrigation water use data are not reported in the Census of Commercial Agriculture, nor are these 
data obtainable from another source. Therefore, estimated annual irrigation requirements are used as a proxy 
for actual irrigation volumes. The estimates are obtained from van der Walt (2017). Specifically, the net irrigation 
requirement (𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) for crop 𝑖, in local municipality 𝑗 and year 𝑡 is calculated as the gross crop water requirement 
(𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑐) for the relevant crop and local municipality, less effective rainfall in local municipality 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Finally, 
this difference is divided by an irrigation efficiency factor (𝑒𝑖𝑗)6. Specifically,  
𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  
(𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑗 − 𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑒 )
𝑒𝑖𝑗
                                                                                                                                                               (3) 
The potential pitfall in using this method to estimate irrigation water application is that, for a particularly dry 
year that forces farmers to under irrigate crops, the method will result in over estimates of crop irrigation 
volumes – farmers are assumed to compensate for lower effective rainfall by increasing irrigation volumes, 
which may not be feasible under drought conditions.  
 
The mean annual effective rainfall for the Berg WMA was calculated as 453mm, 541mm and 556mm in 1993, 
2002 and 2007 respectively. This compares to a long-term average annual rainfall for the region of 517mm.7 
Effective rainfall for the three years under consideration do not appear too dissimilar to the long-term average 
and the estimated irrigation requirements are assumed valid. 
 
Because the data are grouped at the magisterial district level, the variables for crop revenue, irrigated cropland, 
and irrigation water are put on a per-farm basis by dividing by the number of farms present in the district. The 
average values are unbiased estimates of the corresponding farm-level values for a representative farm, and are 
compatible with the farm-level model specified by the model (Moore & Negri, 1992)8. Crop prices and gross 
farming revenue are converted to 2015 price level using the Consumer Price Index (Statistics South Africa, 2016). 
 
Functional form  
The Translog functional form (Christensen, Jorgenson & Lau, 1973) is used to estimate the crop-level revenue 
functions from which the shadow price estimates are then derived. The Translog function represents a flexible 
functional form, which allows the data to reveal the structure of the economic and physical relationships while 
imposing few characteristics on that structure (Casler, 1997). However, the greater flexibility is achieved at the 
expense of a reduction in degrees of freedom and increased multicollinearity between regressors since the full 
specification includes a large number of non-linear and interaction terms.  
 
                                                                
6 The irrigation efficiency factors were obtained from The Irrigation Efficiency Training Manual (2015). 
Irrigation systems were characterised as either drip irrigation (95% efficiency), micro-sprinkler (85% efficiency), 
centre pivot (90% efficiency), or sprinkler (90% efficiency). 
7 Author’s own calculations using the Land Degradation in South Africa dataset (Hoffman et al., 1999). 
8 Putting the variables on a per-farm basis avoids the problems associated with non-aggregability of the 
Translog functional form. 
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Given the limited observations in the dataset, parsimony in parameters must be balanced against flexibility. 
Restrictions are therefore imposed on the number of interaction terms included in the specification. Specifically, 
other-crop average prices (included to control for the jointness in production imposed by a quasi-fixed water 
endowment) are interacted only with the irrigation water variable. 
 
Thus, the functional form to be estimated is given by:  
 
ln(𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑤,𝑖 ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑤𝑤,𝑖
ln (𝑤𝑖𝑡)
2
2
+ 𝛽𝑐,𝑖 ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑐𝑐,𝑖
ln (𝑐𝑖𝑡)
2
2
+  𝛽𝑝,𝑖 ln(𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑝𝑝,𝑖
ln (𝑝𝑖𝑡)
2
2
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑗,𝑖 ln(?̅?𝑗𝑡) 
5
𝑗=1
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑖
ln(?̅?𝑗𝑡) 
2
2
5
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽𝑤𝑐,𝑖 ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽𝑤𝑝,𝑖 ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) ln(𝑝𝑖𝑡)
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑤𝑗,𝑖 ln(𝑤𝑖) ln(?̅?𝑗𝑡) 
5
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽𝑐𝑝,𝑖 ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) ln(𝑝𝑖𝑡)                                                                         (4) 
where ?̅?𝑗 are the average price levels for the 5 crop groups (field crops, citrus, deciduous fruit, viticulture and 
vegetables) and 𝑅𝑖, 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖  and 𝑝𝑖  represent the same variables as before.  
 
It therefore follows that the estimated marginal revenue, or shadow price, of irrigation water is equal to  
 
𝜆𝑡  (𝑤𝑖𝑡 , 𝑐𝑖𝑡 , 𝑝𝑖𝑡 , ?̅?𝑗𝑡 , 𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  
𝜕𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡
=  
𝜕ln (𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝜕ln (𝑤𝑖𝑡)
∙
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡
=  𝜀𝑅𝑤,𝑖 ∙
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡
 
=  [𝛽𝑤,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑤𝑤,𝑖 ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽𝑤𝑐,𝑖𝑡 ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽𝑤𝑝,𝑖 ln(𝑝𝑖𝑡) +  ∑ 𝛽𝑤𝑗,𝑖 ln(?̅?𝑗𝑡)  
5
𝑗=1
] ∙
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡
                                    (5) 
where 𝜀𝑅𝑤,𝑖  can be shown to be the elasticity of revenue with respect to irrigation water. Thus, the shadow price 
of irrigation water for crop 𝑖 is a function of the revenue-water elasticity of crop 𝑖 multiplied by the average 
value of output per m3 of irrigation water applied to that crop. In turn, the revenue-water elasticity is a non-
linear function of the level of irrigation water input, composite input and output prices.  
 
Econometric Considerations  
Several econometric issues are raised by the presence of corner solutions, aggregation, pooled time series and 
cross-sectional observations, spatial heterogeneity, and joint production. Not all of these issues can be 
addressed in the current application and with existing econometric techniques.  
Corner Solutions and Censoring  
The first econometric issue arises due to corner solutions, since farmers in every magisterial district do not find 
it optimal to grow all the irrigated crops produced in the region - non-zero production is observed to range 
between 37.5% of observations for irrigated wheat up to 83.3% for table grapes. The use of ordinary least 
squares in the presence of data censoring will result in inconsistent estimates of the model parameters 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p.524) as well as in the loss of information that can explain the decision to grow a crop 
(Moore & Negri, 1992). This is because factors which increase the expected income from a particular crop also 
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increase the probability that the crop is cultivated. The opposite is true of factors which decrease the expected 
income from a particular crop.  
 
Appropriate estimation should, therefore, make use of a limited dependent variable model such as the Tobit 
model (Tobin, 1958). The Tobit model decomposes the farmer’s behaviour into a discrete-choice decision (on 
whether to participate in production of a particular irrigated crop) and an intensity decision (on the levels of 
inputs required to maximise revenue). A restriction of the Tobit model is that the same relationship is assumed 
to determine both an individual’s quantity and participation decisions (Bockstael et al., 1990; Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005). Two-part models such as the Cragg (1971) model provide an extension to the Tobit model that relaxes 
this assumption, but could not be used in the current application due to difficulty in achieving convergence of 
the maximum likelihood estimator. However, it is reasonable to assume that, in agricultural production, the 
characteristics that influence a farmer’s decision to grow a certain crop are the same characteristics that 
influence the intensity with which that farmer cultivates the crop9 (Bockstael et al., 1990) Thus, the model is 
estimated using a Tobit model.  
 
A further consideration is that the Tobit model employs strong distributional assumptions - estimation will be 
inconsistent if the error term is either heteroscedastic or non-normally distributed (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). 
The logarithmic transformation of variables implicit in the translog functional form makes the normality 
assumption more plausible (Wooldridge, 2002). A conditional moments test of the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed errors is reported for each of the regressions (Pagan & Vella, 1989; Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). The 
issue of heteroskedastic errors is addressed below.  
Aggregation and Heteroscedasticity  
Heteroscedasticity is likely to arise due to data aggregation and the Tobit estimator will be inconsistent unless 
the heteroscedasticity is correctly addressed.  Aggregate farm-level data can be expected to have unequal 
variability since the number of farms differs across magisterial districts, therefore districts with a larger number 
of farms will likely have a smaller error variance than districts with fewer farms (Moor & Negri, 1992). Therefore, 
heteroscedasticity is assumed to result from the number of farms, and the estimators are weighted according 
to the number of farms in each magisterial district.10 To ensure that this correction solves the heteroscedasticity 
problem a Lagrange multiplier test of the null of heteroscedasticity is reported for each regression (Greene, 
2005, p.769).  
Joint Production and Contemporaneous Correlation 
The presence of fixed, allocable inputs imposes joint production and it is therefore likely that the errors will be 
contemporaneously correlated across crops. As such, efficient estimation requires the simultaneous estimation 
                                                                
9 This is because the a factor, or input, that increases the expected profitability of a farmer growing a particular 
crop not only increases the probability that the farmer will choose to cultivate that crop (because it is more 
likely to be more profitable to cultivate than other irrigated crops) but also increases the intensity with which 
the farmer chooses to cultivate that crop (since higher intensity cultivation raises expected crop-level profits 
from that crop) 
10 This approach closely follows the correction for heteroscedasticity employed by Moore and Negri (1992) to 
estimate crop-level output supply equations. 
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of a system of equations (Wooldridge, 2002, p.163). Unfortunately, estimation of the Tobit model for a set of 16 
crops via a systems framework is computationally intractable. Inefficient estimation is, therefore, ignored in 
favour of addressing the inconsistency associated with censored data and the model is estimated equation by 
equation.  
Unobserved Heterogeneity  
Unobserved individual heterogeneity is often a significant component in agricultural production models, and 
capture determinants of yield and productivity that are not explained by the observed regressors (Lacroix & 
Thomas, 2011). These unobserved effects could include soil fertility and drainage, climatic variables, or irrigation 
and management practices. They can also be largely time-invariant (e.g. soil fertility and long-term climatic 
conditions) or unexpected shocks specific to the growing season (e.g. input price shocks).  
 
When panel data exist, analysis can potentially exploit the data structure to control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity through the incorporation of either fixed or random effects. However, in the Tobit model inclusion 
of fixed effects introduces the incidental parameters problem which is generally expected to introduce a small 
sample bias into the parameter estimator (Greene, 2005, p.717). Furthermore, random effects estimation 
requires the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors in the model. This 
assumption would be unrealistic in the current application, since unobserved soil and climatic variables are most 
likely correlated with levels of irrigation water use. 
 
In an attempt to control for some of the unobserved heterogeneity, year dummies as well as dummy variables 
(and interactions) representing general geological and climatic conditions are included in the regression 
specification. The year dummies control for any unexpected shocks to production that occur within the growing 
season, as well as controlling for any aggregate changes over time.  
 
The primary source of remaining heterogeneity is assumed to result from differences in soil fertility across the 
region. Therefore, a dummy variable representing above average soil fertility11 is included in the model. 
Additionally, interaction terms between the soil fertility dummy and the full set of irrigation water and 
composite input variables are included. Interaction terms between the year dummies and the soil fertility 
dummy are also included. These interaction terms allow the intercept in the revenue function to vary over time 
and across soil fertility. The relationship between revenue and the level of irrigation water and the composite 
input is also allowed to vary across soil fertility level.  
 
A further five dummy variables to control for general geological, climatic and managerial conditions are included. 
These include dummy variables for a high average slope, high levels of erosion, higher than average summer 
                                                                
11 Constructed from the soil fertility index in the Land Degradation dataset (Hoffmann et al., 1999) 
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rainfall seasonality and high summer rainfall. A dummy variable representing above average farm size is included 
as a proxy for farming intensity, which is assumed to be inversely proportional to farm size.12  
 
Regression Estimates  
Table 6 presents some parameter estimates for the translog revenue functions for four crops - lucerne, peaches, 
table grapes and potatoes. For ease of reference, only a subset of the full 41 estimated parameters per crop are 
reported. 13  These results are broadly representative of the overall results. The full set of regression estimates 
can be found in Table A1 of the Appendix.  
                                                                
12 In particular, the dummy variables are generated so that they are equal to 1 if the value of the variable in a 
particular magisterial district is greater than the average value of that variable across the whole of the Berg 
WMA, and equal to zero if it is below the average. Thus, the dummy variables represent above average levels 
of each of the 5 variables considered.  
13 In particular, the reported estimates are the conditional marginal effects – or the marginal effect on revenue 
conditional on non-zero production. These are the marginal effects of interest in the presence of corner 
solutions (Wooldridge, 2002, p.527).  
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Table 6: Conditional Marginal Effects for Selected Variables and Crops  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Lucerne Peaches Table Grapes Potatoes 
Water Input         
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) 0.154*** 0.328*** 0.182*** 0.241*** 
 (0.00143) (0.00337) (0.00937) (0.0205) 
ln (𝑤𝑖𝑡)
2
2
 0.0496*** 0.00801*** -0.0980*** 0.0475*** 
(0.000472) (0.000519) (0.00202) (0.00362) 
Composite Input     
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) -15.62*** 0.435*** 1.218*** 7.474*** 
 (0.203) (0.0106) (0.0368) (0.148) 
ln (𝑐𝑖𝑡)
2
2
 -4.739*** -0.117*** -1.227*** 2.111*** 
(0.450) (0.00528) (0.0295) (0.162) 
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) -1.304*** 0.0750*** -0.0210*** -0.132*** 
(0.0175) (0.000762) (0.00396) (0.0124) 
Own Output Price     
ln(𝑝𝑖𝑡) -0.0358*** 0.338*** 0.200*** -0.173*** 
 (0.00243) (0.00478) (0.00932) (0.0289) 
ln (𝑝𝑖𝑡)
2
2
 -0.00918*** 0.0566*** 0.0559*** 0.223*** 
(0.00108) (0.00108) (0.00216) (0.00740) 
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) ln(𝑝𝑖𝑡) 0.0534*** 0.0237*** 0.0422*** 0.0346*** 
 (0.000108) (0.000380) (0.00108) (0.00264) 
Dummy Controls     
High Soil Fertility -6.900*** 5.204*** -2.708*** -13.62*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0944) (0.143) (0.189) 
High Slope 0.412*** 1.444*** -0.594*** -1.021*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0249) (0.0693) (0.294) 
High Erosion 3.276*** 0.270*** -0.259*** -0.407** 
 (0.0180) (0.0308) (0.0641) (0.165) 
Above average summer rainfall seasonality -4.332*** -1.808*** -0.539*** 2.498*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0311) (0.0687) (0.185) 
High Summer Rainfall -2.501*** -0.329*** -0.273* -0.537*** 
 (0.00928) (0.107) (0.139) (0.193) 
High Average Farm Size 0.168*** 0.216** -0.930*** 0.464* 
 (0.0265) (0.0968) (0.117) (0.256) 
Soil Fertility Interactions     
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) 0.0543*** -0.0285*** 0.636*** 0.665*** 
 (0.00206) (0.00830) (0.0183) (0.0171) 
ln (𝑤𝑖𝑡)
2
2
 0.103*** -0.0428*** -0.0735*** 0.223*** 
(0.000645) (0.00123) (0.00413) (0.00302) 
ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) 9.652*** -2.263*** 1.977*** -4.249*** 
 (0.212) (0.0354) (0.213) (0.119) 
ln (𝑐𝑖𝑡)
2
2
 14.68*** 0.0594*** 0.866** 1.370*** 
(0.451) (0.0108) (0.352) (0.153) 
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑡) ln(𝑐𝑖𝑡) 0.651*** -0.0163*** -0.347*** -0.248*** 
 (0.0181) (0.00210) (0.0224) (0.0103) 
     
Log-Likelihood 47.02 18.36 20.27 -3.28 
AIC -80.05 -12.72 -14.55 32.56 
BIC -66.95 9.73 9.78 56.89 
Observations 48 48 48 48 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Input and Price Variables 
Overall the parameter estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. For all crops 
the irrigation water terms are statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficients on the composite input 
terms are similarly significant. This accords with the expectation that irrigation water and the composite input 
are important determinants of output and revenue for irrigated crops in the Berg WMA. Furthermore, the 
majority of the coefficients on the average crop price terms are statistically significant at conventional levels, 
suggesting that irrigation water is a quasi-fixed input in the region and that production is therefore joint for 
irrigated agriculture.  
 
The sign and magnitude of the coefficients on the input and price variables are difficult to relate to theoretical 
expectations. There is only one theoretical property of the revenue function related to input endowments: that 
the revenue function should be non-decreasing in an output (Chambers, 1988, p.263). Due to the inclusion of 
non-linear and interaction terms, this property does not provide any guidance on the expected signs on any of 
the coefficients on the input variables. However, it should be expected that coefficients combine such that the 
marginal effect with respect to each input is non-negative - given the levels of irrigation water, composite input 
and output prices (i.e. irrigation water shadow price estimates should be non-negative). Similarly, the inclusion 
of interaction and non-linear price terms implies that there are no theoretical expectations placed on the 
individual parameter estimates.  
 
Heterogeneity Controls  
The soil and climatic control variables function differently in a multicrop model with a fixed, allocable input. 
Because crops compete for resources, the coefficients on these variables should be interpreted as a measure of 
the comparative advantage of the variable in producing a particular crop, as opposed to its absolute advantage 
(Moore & Negri, 1992, p.35). For instance, the negative coefficients on high fertility soil estimated for lucerne 
and potatoes implies that less production is less extensive in high productivity soil for these two crops, which 
are comparatively more profitable in low productivity soil. It does not imply that high productivity soil will result 
in lower potato or lucerne revenues than low productivity soil will.  
 
The coefficients on the high average slope, erosion, summer rainfall, summer aridity and farm size should be 
interpreted similarly. Overall these coefficients are highly statistically significant and accord with agroeconomic 
expectations. For instance, the results suggest that lucerne has a comparative advantage on marginal land with 
relatively low productivity soil, steep slope and high levels of erosion. On the other hand, potatoes have a 
comparative advantage in areas with below average slope, which receive above average summer rainfall as a 
percentage of winter rainfall and have relatively larger average farm sizes (a proxy for lower intensity 
agriculture). 
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The interaction terms between the high soil fertility dummy and the irrigation water and composite input 
variables are statistically significant overall. 14  This suggests that differences in soil fertility result in significant 
differences in the relationship between crop revenues and levels of irrigation water and composite inputs.  
 
Tests of Assumptions 
The normality and heteroscedasticity test results can be found in Table A.2 of the appendix. The results from 
the Conditional Moments, show that the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals is not rejected at 
conventional levels of significance for all crops. Similarly, the Lagrange Multiplier test for heteroskedastic errors 
is not rejected for any of the crops at conventional levels of significance. Thus, one can conclude that the Tobit 
model assumptions are met and the estimators are consistent.  
 
Marginal Value Estimates  
Using the parameter estimates presented in Table A1 and the mean levels of irrigation water input, composite 
input and prices the marginal value of irrigation water is estimated for each magisterial district in the Berg WMA 
for 16 crops according to equation (5). The full set of estimates can be found in Table A2 of the Appendix. In 
addition to the point estimates, the standard error of each prediction is reported as well as a Wald test of the 
null hypothesis that the prediction is equal to zero against a two-sided alternative is conducted to test the 
significance of each estimate, according to the method proposed by Park and Phillips (1988).  
 
For the majority of crops the marginal value estimates for all magisterial districts are statistically significant from 
zero at the 10%-level or below. Additionally, only three estimates are negative, but these are not statistically 
different from zero. On the other hand, 13 out of 15 of the estimates for wine grapes are insignificant and a 
number of the estimates for table grapes and tomatoes were also insignificant. This is likely an indication that, 
either the model did not accurately describe irrigation practices for these crops, or that there were too few 
observations to generate accurate estimates. However, on balance the model appears to generate significant 
and plausible shadow price estimates.  
 
Overall Mean Estimates 
The overall mean shadow price estimates for the irrigated crops in the Berg WMA are reported in Table 6, and 
ranked according to the shadow price estimates. Table 7 reports the mean average water productivity as well 
as the mean estimated revenue-water elasticity for each crop. The range of estimates is similar to those obtained 
by Louw (2001) of 0 – 5.99 2015 rand per m3 and appear plausible. Notably, average water productivity differs 
significantly from the marginal value for all crops. This is the result of estimated elasticities that are significantly 
different from one. The result highlights the importance that water policy decisions are made on the basis of 
marginal value estimates rather than average value estimates. Average values are inherently ‘historic’, 
                                                                
14 It is notable that the percentage of statistically significant parameter estimates increased from 83% to 95% 
for the model including soil fertility dummy interactions and the other control dummies compared to the basic 
translog model.  
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illustrating how much output-value was achieved for a given level of irrigation water application. Furthermore, 
an average value takes the production decisions taken by farmers as given and fixed. On the other hand, the 
marginal value figures are inherently forward looking and estimate how output value will change if the level of 
irrigation water application changes, while further allowing certain dimensions of farmers production decisions 
to change in response to changes in the availability of irrigation water supply. 
 
Table 7: Overall Mean Estimates for Berg WMA 
Crop Marginal Value (𝑅/𝑚3) 
𝑅𝑖
𝑤𝑖
 
𝜀𝑅𝑤,𝑖  
Peaches 4.84 14.61 0.33 
Tomatoes 4.78 13.97 0.34 
Table Grapes 4.36 16.90 0.26 
Potatoes 3.10 9.02 0.34 
Wine Grapes 2.99 24.67 0.12 
Apples 2.69 11.48 0.23 
Cabbage 2.27 6.82 0.33 
Lemons 2.20 2.63 0.84 
Naartjies 1.92 4.74 0.40 
Oranges 1.90 2.30 0.83 
Onions 1.82 6.22 0.29 
Carrots 1.74 7.75 0.22 
Pears 1.45 5.48 0.26 
Pumpkins 1.10 4.09 0.27 
Lucerne 0.64 0.44 1.44 
Wheat  0.14 1.12 0.12 
 
 
Mean Estimates by Local Municipality  
Table 8 presents a summary of the crop marginal value estimates, reporting the mean estimates for the seven 
local municipalities in the Berg WMA. Notably, there is significant variation in the mean shadow price estimates 
across crops within the same local municipality. Assuming that farmers are making rational water application 
decisions, this suggests a limitation in the empirical application, since the optimal farm-level allocation of the 
water occurs when its marginal value is equal across crops grown. This limitation may be the result of the use of 
aggregate data, or because the assumption of cropland representing a composite input does not hold for all 
crops. However, it is likely to (at least in part) be the result of unobserved heterogeneity which has not been 
accounted for.  
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Overall Mean Estimates by Soil Fertility  
In Table 9 the overall mean shadow prices are reported for areas with high- and low-fertility soil separately. The 
results highlight the significant effect of soil fertility on the marginal value of irrigation water for all crops, except 
cabbage. Notably, soil fertility raises the marginal value of irrigation water for the majority of crops but lowers 
the marginal value for a significant proportion as well. Indeed, while the most efficient irrigated crop in high 
fertility soil is table grapes, this is not the case in low fertility soil where peaches are the most efficient. Thus, 
the overall mean shadow prices presented in Table 7 mask significant variation in the shadow price estimates 
which result simply from differences in soil fertility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Mean Marginal Values by Local Municipality (R/m3) 
Local Municipality Wheat Lucerne Oranges Lemons Naartjies Peaches Pears Apples 
Bergrivier 0.02 1.73 2.47 2.29 0.81 3.74 0.73 2.80 
City of Cape Town - 0.16 2.44 1.89 3.13 4.06 1.15 2.08 
Drakenstein 0.66 0.03 1.80 2.84 1.64 2.93 0.96 2.05 
Saldanha 0.03 0.85 - - - - - - 
Stellenbosch - 0.59 1.57 2.24 1.60 9.51 2.59 5.10 
Swartland 0.07 0.46 1.55 1.89 1.92 3.00 1.55 2.63 
Witzenberg 0.04 0.67 1.60 2.07 2.41 5.80 1.72 1.45 
         
Table 8 Continued 
Local Municipality Table Grapes Wine Grapes Potatoes Tomatoes Onions Pumpkins Carrots Cabbage 
Bergrivier 3.56 1.16 2.25 1.84 1.54 1.03 - 0.54 
City of Cape Town 4.59 6.81 5.80 4.30 2.41 1.13 1.67 1.69 
Drakenstein 5.96 2.25 2.25 4.04 1.28 1.00 0.93 2.91 
Saldanha 0.11 3.11 1.35 - - - - - 
Stellenbosch 7.56 7.03 2.82 9.71 1.06 1.24 1.70 2.92 
Swartland 6.66 0.45 3.92 6.14 1.70 1.07 2.25 3.78 
Witzenberg 2.07 0.15 3.32 2.67 2.93 1.12 2.14 1.76 
Table 9: Overall Mean Marginal Values by Soil Fertility 
Crop 
High Fertility 
Soil  Low Fertility Soil Overall Mean 
Peaches 4.70 4.98 4.84 
Tomatoes 5.31 4.25 4.78 
Table Grapes 5.76 2.96 4.36 
Potatoes 3.71 2.49 3.10 
Wine Grapes 3.07 2.91 2.99 
Apples 2.37 3.01 2.69 
Cabbages 2.30 2.24 2.27 
Lemons 2.01 2.39 2.20 
Naartjies 2.09 1.75 1.92 
Oranges 1.72 2.08 1.90 
Onions 2.20 1.44 1.82 
Carrots 2.07 1.41 1.74 
Pears 1.90 1.00 1.45 
Pumpkins 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Lucerne 0.50 0.78 0.64 
Wheat 0.05 0.23 0.14 
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Discussion and Conclusion  
This study set out three objectives. First, the study aimed to establish reliable estimates of the marginal benefit 
of commercial irrigation water in the Berg WMA. The crop-level estimates generated by the study are broadly 
in line with previous estimates obtained for commercial irrigation in the Berg region, and suggest that agriculture 
is likely to generate the lowest marginal benefit from irrigation water when compared to industrial and municipal 
users in the Berg WMA. The methodology also highlights the significant effect that on-farm conditions, such as 
soil fertility, has on the marginal benefit of water in irrigated agriculture. Thus, while crop-choice has a significant 
effect on the overall efficiency of water use in the commercial agricultural sector, the study shows that the 
marginal benefit of agricultural water is heterogeneous, nuanced and likely to be affected by a variety of factors.  
 
However, the study focuses on the economic value of agricultural water and does not evaluate other dimensions 
of value, such as environmental or social value. These are important dimensions of value, but are left for other 
studies to evaluate. In addition, the study estimates short-run marginal values for commercial irrigation water. 
Short-run marginal values of irrigation water provide an indication of how the value of irrigated production 
would change in response to a change in the quantum of water available agricultural producers within a growing 
season, with land allocation and crop-choice decisions having already been made by the farmer. Longer-run 
marginal value estimates, on the other hand, will likely be lower than the short-run estimates. In response to a 
decrease in available irrigation water in the long-run, farmers would be able adapt land allocation and cropping 
patterns, as well as invest in water-saving technologies (such as more efficient irrigation infrastructure) in order 
to mitigate the effect on production value of the change in available irrigation water supply. Thus, the estimates 
from this study are likely to overstate the long-run values on which water policy ought to be formulated.  In 
addition, the study models the marginal value of irrigation water to perennial and annual crops in the identically. 
This ignores the fact that the marginal revenues for perennial crops may be thought of as not only the marginal 
revenues in the current year, rather are the discounted present values of revenues if the crops are watered and 
thus maintained for production in future years.  
 
The second objective of the study was to develop an econometric basis for estimating the marginal value of 
agricultural irrigation water, which can be easily adapted for application in other constrained catchments in 
South Africa. The model developed in this study is estimable using data readily available across South Africa, and 
is based on profit maximizing behaviour of farmers. The model also incorporates the multi-output nature of 
irrigated agriculture and the institutional setting that characterises irrigation water allocation. However, the 
model methodology does contain limitations resulting from data limitations. First, the model makes a relatively 
strong assumption that cropland represents a composite input. If this assumption fails, the estimates will be 
biased in an indeterminate direction. Second, the methodology employs a farm-level model of agricultural 
production but is estimated using data for a representative farm obtained from aggregate data. This too may 
result in biased estimates. The methodology can, however, easily address these deficiencies if more 
comprehensive, farm-level data becomes available. In particular, a greater number of observations would allow 
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the econometric model to be extended to a more flexible double-hurdle model or a Heckman selection model. 
The model could also be extended to include a full-set of interaction terms in the translog functional form, and 
allow for more controls for on-farm conditions to be included. Farm-level data would also improve the quality 
of the heterogeneity control variables, and might facilitate the use of actual water use data rather than an 
estimate thereof. 
 
The final aim of this study was to advance and facilitate public policy that efficiently allocates scarce water 
resources and minimises the constraint on economic development imposed by limited water resources. Indeed, 
the findings from this study suggest that intersectoral reallocation of water supplies presents an opportunity for 
increasing the economic efficiency of the allocation of water in the Berg WMA. Reallocation of water away from 
the agricultural sector, towards industrial uses such as the Saldanha Bay IDZ would make a significant 
contribution towards minimizing the constraint placed on economic development by limited water resources.  
 
Furthermore, the study highlights the importance that policymakers make use of forward looking marginal value 
estimates. The study also highlights areas in which more reliable and accurate estimates could be obtained by 
extending the methodology of this study to a more comprehensive dataset. Policymakers should consider the 
need for a comprehensive, publicly available, farm-level survey of irrigated agriculture. Such a survey would 
greatly enhance the effectiveness of policymaking with respect to both water allocation and economic 
development. 
 
Lastly, the findings of this study also imply that policymakers must adopt an approach to intersectoral 
reallocation that acknowledges the nuance inherent in irrigated agriculture. In particular, such an approach to 
intersectoral reallocation that focuses on the agricultural sector should recognise that several factors are likely 
to affect the marginal benefit generated by irrigation water. Data and methodological limitations restrict the 
extent to which a policymaker is able to observe and account for this heterogeneity. However, farmers are 
incentivised to make rational production decisions and have significantly more information on the productivity 
of irrigation water for their farm than a policymaker does. Thus, if policymakers wish to reallocate water away 
from irrigated agriculture efficiently they should avoid prescribing any particular area or crop-type from which 
to reallocate the water. Instead, policymakers should reallocate water away from farmers and allow them to 
rationally allocate their remaining quota. In the short- to intermediate run farmers will continue to allocate 
water efficiently between the irrigated crops grown, while in the long-run they will change their crop-choice so 
as generate the maximum benefit from the irrigation water quota available to them.  
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Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Parameter
Wheat Lucerne Lemons Oranges Naartjies Apples Peaches Pears
Table 
Grapes
Wine 
Grapes
Potatoes Tomatoes Onions Pumpkins Carrots Cabbage
Water
0.0936*** 0.154*** 0.391*** 0.157*** 0.224*** 0.293*** 0.328*** 0.382*** 0.182*** 0.945*** 0.241*** 1.559*** 0.929*** 0.741*** 0.181*** 0.0518***
(0.000319) (0.00143) (4.52e-06) (0.00257) (0.00101) (0.00160) (0.00337) (0.00169) (0.00937) (0.0288) (0.0205) (0.0315) (0.00715) (0.0220) (0.0127) (0.00763)
0.0114*** 0.0496*** 0.0365*** 0.0440*** 0.0348*** -0.00709*** 0.00801*** -0.0178*** -0.0980*** -0.112*** 0.0475*** -0.180*** 0.0223*** -0.0675*** -0.0764*** -0.0655***
(5.05e-05) (0.000472) (1.22e-06) (0.000481) (0.000236) (0.000296) (0.000519) (0.000261) (0.00202) (0.00518) (0.00362) (0.00733) (0.00122) (0.00461) (0.00227) (0.00139)
Composite Input
0.436*** -15.62*** -4.110*** 1.115*** 3.481*** 1.223*** 0.435*** 0.490*** 1.218*** 3.227*** 7.474*** -43.40*** 2.000*** 7.442*** -1.255*** -2.036***
(0.00160) (0.203) (0.000557) (0.0377) (0.0848) (0.00998) (0.0106) (0.00587) (0.0368) (0.0920) (0.148) (0.828) (0.0199) (0.274) (0.0941) (0.0556)
-0.0642*** -4.739*** 134.9*** -4.259*** -106.2*** -1.090*** -0.117*** -0.638*** -1.227*** -0.650*** 2.111*** 316.8*** -0.0265 -2.692*** 4.929*** 1.204***
(0.000846) (0.450) (0.00383) (0.0544) (0.293) (0.00898) (0.00528) (0.00324) (0.0295) (0.0444) (0.162) (3.368) (0.0305) (0.504) (0.116) (0.0730)
0.0227*** -1.304*** -1.534*** 0.101*** 0.111*** 0.0490*** 0.0750*** -0.0460*** -0.0210*** -0.128*** -0.132*** 2.708*** 0.0625*** -0.472*** -0.358*** -0.571***
(0.000114) (0.0175) (5.62e-05) (0.00294) (0.00743) (0.000818) (0.000762) (0.000453) (0.00396) (0.00806) (0.0124) (0.0853) (0.00128) (0.0263) (0.00839) (0.00469)
Own Output Prices
0.251*** -0.0358*** 0.387*** 0.158*** 0.129*** 0.0713*** 0.338*** 0.266*** 0.200*** -0.905*** -0.173*** 0.680*** 0.263*** 0.178*** 1.007*** 0.631***
(0.000489) (0.00243) (4.58e-06) (0.00322) (0.00111) (0.00211) (0.00478) (0.00258) (0.00932) (0.0371) (0.0289) (0.0298) (0.00933) (0.0287) (0.0182) (0.0109)
0.0641*** -0.00918*** 0.0626*** 0.0721*** 0.0293*** 0.0131*** 0.0566*** 0.0444*** 0.0559*** -0.231*** 0.223*** -0.142*** -0.0417*** 0.0651*** 0.220*** 0.213***
(0.000123) (0.00108) (1.29e-06) (0.000794) (0.000269) (0.000500) (0.00108) (0.000651) (0.00216) (0.00873) (0.00740) (0.00708) (0.00241) (0.00779) (0.00471) (0.00307)
0.0111*** 0.0534*** 0.0298*** 0.0286*** 0.0290*** 0.0275*** 0.0237*** 0.0510*** 0.0422*** 0.149*** 0.0346*** 0.0589*** 0.0687*** -0.0728*** 0.0287*** 0.0529***
(4.01e-05) (0.000108) (6.19e-07) (0.000315) (0.000124) (0.000194) (0.000380) (0.000212) (0.00108) (0.00341) (0.00264) (0.00386) (0.000934) (0.00310) (0.00164) (0.00109)
0.0495*** -0.209*** -1.893*** 0.122*** 1.764*** 0.0763*** -0.0237*** 0.130*** 0.191*** 0.133*** -0.759*** -9.128*** -0.137*** 0.237*** 0.559*** 0.705***
(0.000202) (0.0265) (7.41e-05) (0.00458) (0.0103) (0.00126) (0.00124) (0.000705) (0.00423) (0.0105) (0.0192) (0.102) (0.00271) (0.0368) (0.0120) (0.00807)
Average Other Crop Prices 
-0.140*** -0.218*** 0.221*** -0.159*** -0.116*** -0.0711*** -0.128*** 1.210*** 0.496*** -0.157** 0.916*** -0.0483 0.655*** 0.148*** 0.720*** -0.669***
(0.000828) (0.00854) (4.21e-06) (0.00326) (0.00129) (0.00571) (0.0117) (0.00436) (0.0152) (0.0787) (0.0466) (0.0435) (0.0104) (0.0396) (0.0574) (0.0134)
-0.00361*** -0.126*** 0.0667*** -0.0560*** -0.0729*** 0.0181*** 0.116*** -0.113*** -0.128*** 0.113*** 0.159*** 0.221*** 0.325*** -0.0116 0.104*** -0.0614***
(0.000206) (0.00187) (1.15e-06) (0.000791) (0.000378) (0.00153) (0.00317) (0.00120) (0.00424) (0.0218) (0.0128) (0.0111) (0.00282) (0.0102) (0.0156) (0.00348)
0.118*** 0.000716 -0.141*** -0.288*** -0.0779*** 0.0282*** 0.115*** 0.0385*** 0.311*** 1.263*** -1.136*** -0.447*** 0.637*** -0.615*** -0.779*** 0.211***
(0.000709) (0.00356) (4.20e-06) (0.00292) (0.00123) (0.00233) (0.00494) (0.00247) (0.00901) (0.0341) (0.0372) (0.0302) (0.0101) (0.0318) (0.0253) (0.00781)
-0.0613*** -0.000601 -0.168*** 0.0335*** -0.0676*** -0.00234*** 0.0225*** 0.0136*** -0.187*** -0.0665*** -0.0705*** -0.0147* -0.0961*** 0.0927*** -0.0252*** -0.190***
(0.000181) (0.000905) (1.10e-06) (0.000745) (0.000342) (0.000590) (0.00115) (0.000597) (0.00214) (0.00845) (0.00969) (0.00790) (0.00266) (0.00819) (0.00707) (0.00206)
0.107*** 0.0553*** 0.639*** -0.246*** -0.109*** 0.0716*** -1.959*** 0.713*** 0.837*** -0.679*** 1.370*** 0.414*** 0.956*** -0.631*** 0.360*** -0.673***
(0.000519) (0.00183) (6.06e-06) (0.00495) (0.00319) (0.00679) (0.0161) (0.00776) (0.0203) (0.0773) (0.0413) (0.0640) (0.0143) (0.0471) (0.0825) (0.0201)
0.0436*** -0.218*** 0.0510*** 0.0706*** 0.0329*** 0.0404*** 0.120*** -0.0358*** -0.133*** 0.0771*** -0.159*** -0.310*** -0.205*** 0.263*** -0.321*** 0.261***
(0.000141) (0.000868) (1.82e-06) (0.00153) (0.000941) (0.00194) (0.00471) (0.00214) (0.00578) (0.0226) (0.0115) (0.0180) (0.00426) (0.0139) (0.0252) (0.00599)
-0.0276*** -0.139*** 0.206*** 0.0269*** 0.0437*** 0.0117*** -0.289*** -0.173*** 0.0150 1.576*** -0.318*** -0.154*** -0.306*** -0.0172 0.0661*** 0.0630***
(0.000571) (0.00221) (3.62e-06) (0.00315) (0.00109) (0.00228) (0.00474) (0.00223) (0.00932) (0.0329) (0.0304) (0.0312) (0.00717) (0.0257) (0.0203) (0.00967)
0.0222*** -0.0443*** 0.0795*** 0.0405*** 0.00816*** 0.000307 -0.0788*** -0.00482*** 0.0772*** 0.0539*** 0.192*** 0.0188** 0.0420*** 0.0791*** 0.135*** 0.0160***
(0.000137) (0.000601) (8.68e-07) (0.000761) (0.000258) (0.000560) (0.00107) (0.000501) (0.00214) (0.00824) (0.00771) (0.00769) (0.00174) (0.00647) (0.00541) (0.00241)
0.0218*** -0.146*** -0.466*** 0.0611*** 0.118*** 0.0277*** 0.776*** 0.470*** 0.00250 -0.699*** 0.520*** 0.383*** -0.610*** -0.0125 -0.0370 0.0919***
(0.000583) (0.00218) (3.33e-06) (0.00397) (0.00157) (0.00395) (0.0118) (0.00455) (0.0148) (0.0468) (0.0319) (0.0328) (0.00775) (0.0271) (0.0226) (0.00957)
0.0379*** 0.0249*** -0.297*** 0.0806*** 0.0287*** -0.0149*** -0.119*** -0.477*** 0.0152*** -0.00829 -0.168*** -0.0161* -0.188*** -0.113*** -0.209*** 0.0849***
(0.000166) (0.00120) (7.63e-07) (0.00117) (0.000557) (0.00136) (0.00309) (0.00120) (0.00397) (0.0136) (0.00853) (0.00849) (0.00203) (0.00720) (0.00648) (0.00237)
0.0100*** 0.0528*** 0.0542*** 0.00464*** 0.0117*** -0.0275*** -0.0604*** -0.0303*** 0.00490** -0.0392*** -0.138*** -0.109*** -0.244*** -0.0404*** -0.129*** 0.0320***
(7.85e-05) (0.000866) (6.16e-07) (0.000311) (0.000123) (0.000543) (0.00116) (0.000430) (0.00191) (0.00700) (0.00421) (0.00563) (0.00139) (0.00438) (0.00805) (0.00155)
0.0160*** 0.0189*** -0.000659*** -0.0101*** 0.0119*** 0.0316*** 0.0371*** 0.0321*** 0.0538*** -0.0958*** 0.112*** -0.0982*** -0.0175*** 0.0151*** 0.0381*** 0.0575***
(7.01e-05) (0.000445) (5.84e-07) (0.000287) (0.000122) (0.000206) (0.000393) (0.000204) (0.00102) (0.00393) (0.00323) (0.00387) (0.00122) (0.00358) (0.00228) (0.000732)
0.0123*** 0.157*** -0.00262*** -0.00980*** -0.0120*** -0.0124*** 0.141*** -0.0546*** -0.0322*** 0.0424*** -0.0684*** 0.228*** 0.00135 0.00271 0.0415*** -0.000477
(4.20e-05) (0.000146) (8.72e-07) (0.000484) (0.000284) (0.000628) (0.00135) (0.000743) (0.00235) (0.00694) (0.00370) (0.00751) (0.00138) (0.00509) (0.00924) (0.00226)
0.00360*** 0.0433*** 0.0581*** 0.0259*** 0.0245*** 0.0321*** 0.0100*** 0.0402*** 0.0669*** -0.00457 -0.0262*** 0.0935*** 0.0397*** 0.120*** 0.0738*** 0.0140***
(4.76e-05) (0.000268) (5.39e-07) (0.000310) (0.000116) (0.000197) (0.000378) (0.000190) (0.00107) (0.00360) (0.00272) (0.00398) (0.000873) (0.00282) (0.00172) (0.000969)
0.0174*** 0.0316*** -0.0153*** 0.0300*** 0.0417*** 0.0269*** 0.0179*** 0.0411*** -0.0107*** 0.0575*** -0.00735*** 0.0635*** 0.0697*** 0.0113*** -0.0203*** 0.0281***
(4.78e-05) (0.000295) (5.23e-07) (0.000392) (0.000135) (0.000367) (0.00122) (0.000435) (0.00188) (0.00454) (0.00284) (0.00408) (0.000940) (0.00295) (0.00191) (0.000925)
Table A.1: Full Regression Results (Conditional Marginal Effects)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Parameter
Wheat Lucerne Lemons Oranges Naartjies Apples Peaches Pears
Table 
Grapes
Wine 
Grapes
Potatoes Tomatoes Onions Pumpkins Carrots Cabbage
Year Dummies
2002 0.446*** 1.869*** -0.0612*** 0.0416 1.868*** 0.861*** 2.137*** 0.450*** 0.437** -0.0663 1.583*** 3.877*** -0.560*** -0.340 1.873*** -1.278***
(0.0105) (0.332) (0.000157) (0.0974) (0.0515) (0.0597) (0.101) (0.0576) (0.175) (0.513) (0.319) (0.248) (0.0844) (0.241) (0.352) (0.182)
2007 1.303*** 2.735*** -0.419*** 0.533*** 2.209*** 0.904*** 2.408*** -1.504*** 0.340*** 0.131 0.364 0.877** -7.473*** -0.663*** -1.145*** 1.109***
(0.0120) (0.292) (0.000313) (0.101) (0.0408) (0.0227) (0.0418) (0.0316) (0.116) (0.274) (0.340) (0.440) (0.542) (0.135) (0.175) (0.222)
Soil Fertility Dummies
High Fertility Soil Dummy -1.393*** -6.900*** 2.054*** -1.612*** -0.0563*** -0.585*** 5.204*** -4.525*** -2.708*** 4.433*** -13.62*** -0.122 -6.653*** 1.103*** -0.485** -2.334***
(0.00491) (0.0142) (4.34e-05) (0.0370) (0.0140) (0.0439) (0.0944) (0.0619) (0.143) (0.372) (0.189) (0.343) (0.0842) (0.195) (0.203) (0.0924)
Soil Fertility Interactions
2002 Dummy -0.595*** -1.170*** -0.935*** 1.399*** -0.347*** -0.527*** -1.648*** 0.926*** -0.706** 0.323 -0.165 -3.740*** 1.511*** 0.712*** -0.155 0.204
(0.0242) (0.334) (0.000195) (0.109) (0.106) (0.117) (0.235) (0.0948) (0.297) (0.686) (0.454) (0.293) (0.171) (0.271) (0.572) (0.223)
2007 Dummy -0.888*** -1.054*** -0.0552*** 2.032*** -1.073*** -0.0878 -0.801*** 3.032*** 0.135 0.160 -0.391 -0.641 7.488*** 1.024*** 1.872*** -0.241
(0.0190) (0.326) (0.000344) (0.105) (0.103) (0.0965) (0.119) (0.0989) (0.395) (0.368) (0.378) (0.419) (0.542) (0.172) (0.515) (0.377)
Water 0.0751*** 0.0543*** 0.0971*** 0.0628*** 0.107*** 0.472*** -0.0285*** 0.334*** 0.636*** -0.0260 0.665*** -0.0402 0.985*** 0.118*** 0.481*** 0.208***
(0.000438) (0.00206) (5.70e-06) (0.00392) (0.00113) (0.00379) (0.00830) (0.00568) (0.0183) (0.0343) (0.0171) (0.0391) (0.00826) (0.0212) (0.0171) (0.00860)
Water squared 0.0143*** 0.103*** -0.0434*** 0.0316*** 0.0108*** -0.0575*** -0.0428*** -0.0210*** -0.0735*** -0.0131** 0.223*** -0.0500*** -0.0561*** -0.0392*** -0.0115*** 0.0316***
(7.94e-05) (0.000645) (1.46e-06) (0.000770) (0.000196) (0.000580) (0.00123) (0.000930) (0.00413) (0.00611) (0.00302) (0.00849) (0.00134) (0.00444) (0.00271) (0.00154)
Composite Input 0.283*** 9.652*** -17.93*** -3.403*** -5.294*** -1.108*** -2.263*** 5.048*** 1.977*** -1.359*** -4.249*** -4.377*** -2.273*** 0.223 4.501*** 0.860***
(0.00376) (0.212) (0.000682) (0.0594) (0.0263) (0.0154) (0.0354) (0.0332) (0.213) (0.106) (0.119) (0.892) (0.0235) (0.267) (0.0544) (0.0672)
Composite Input Squared -0.784*** 14.68*** 290.7*** 6.472*** -6.193*** 0.594*** 0.0594*** -2.456*** 0.866** 0.579*** 1.370*** -69.79*** 0.00871 7.341*** -7.750*** 1.678***
(0.00313) (0.451) (0.00730) (0.0723) (0.125) (0.00807) (0.0108) (0.0186) (0.352) (0.0613) (0.153) (3.988) (0.0314) (0.501) (0.101) (0.0918)
Water-Composite Input - 0.651*** -1.804*** -0.111*** - -0.0104*** -0.0163*** -0.0853*** -0.347*** -0.0469*** -0.248*** 5.989*** - -0.500*** -0.218*** -0.0642***
(0.0181) (7.07e-05) (0.00460) (0.00100) (0.00210) (0.00231) (0.0224) (0.00964) (0.0103) (0.0910) (0.0258) (0.00516) (0.00585)
Other Control Dummies
High Slope -0.629*** 0.412*** -0.342*** -0.502*** 1.089*** -0.194*** 1.444*** 0.0326** -0.594*** -0.944*** -1.021*** -1.100*** 1.314*** 1.314*** 2.216*** -0.282***
(0.00978) (0.0393) (7.43e-05) (0.0126) (0.00845) (0.0126) (0.0249) (0.0156) (0.0693) (0.262) (0.294) (0.266) (0.0567) (0.222) (0.171) (0.0947)
High Erosion -0.560*** 3.276*** 0.510*** 0.517*** 0.0715 0.0851*** 0.270*** -2.743*** -0.259*** 0.291 -0.407** -0.584*** -0.814*** 0.842*** -6.482*** 1.717***
(0.00489) (0.0180) (6.16e-05) (0.0406) (0.0636) (0.0164) (0.0308) (0.0163) (0.0641) (0.219) (0.165) (0.181) (0.0433) (0.142) (0.115) (0.0643)
High  Summer Rainfall Seasonality1.934*** -4.332*** 2.245*** -2.163*** -0.801*** -1.038*** -1.808*** 5.067*** -0.539*** 0.0923 2.498*** 0.872*** 5.105*** 1.838*** 0.465*** -1.877***
(0.0124) (0.0267) (3.41e-05) (0.0259) (0.0150) (0.0164) (0.0311) (0.0165) (0.0687) (0.242) (0.185) (0.173) (0.0461) (0.160) (0.131) (0.0648)
High Summer Rainfall -0.295*** -2.501*** -1.275*** -2.985*** 0.599*** -2.165*** -0.329*** 1.034*** -0.273* -0.960*** -0.537*** -4.406*** 4.109*** 0.366* 2.403*** -2.566***
(0.00393) (0.00928) (3.72e-05) (0.0384) (0.0183) (0.0456) (0.107) (0.0555) (0.139) (0.312) (0.193) (0.338) (0.0880) (0.209) (0.190) (0.0809)
High Average Farm Size -0.776*** 0.168*** -0.841*** -0.118*** - 0.594*** 0.216** 4.498*** -0.930*** -0.591** 0.464* 0.792** 2.028*** 0.723*** -5.877*** -1.023***
(0.00528) (0.0265) (4.88e-05) (0.0300) (0.0507) (0.0968) (0.0412) (0.117) (0.297) (0.256) (0.324) (0.113) (0.208) (0.496) (0.141)
Constant -4.185*** -5.113*** -2.368*** -2.692*** -4.439*** -1.018*** -3.220*** -5.410*** -2.455*** -6.066*** -4.564*** -3.147*** -8.401*** -4.805*** -3.475*** -3.627***
(0.00400) (0.0120) (3.00e-05) (0.0260) (0.00917) (0.0180) (0.0419) (0.0197) (0.0805) (0.255) (0.229) (0.250) (0.0586) (0.202) (0.150) (0.0772)
Sigma 0.00127*** 0.00797*** 4.60e-06*** 0.00280*** 0.00276*** 0.00702*** 0.00966*** 0.00604*** 0.0109*** 0.0223*** 0.0224*** 0.0144*** 0.00957*** 0.00957*** 0.0203*** 0.0118***
(3.81e-06) (2.37e-06) (1.03e-07) (6.09e-07) (8.77e-07) (0.000297) (0.000132) (0.000103) (4.43e-05) (0.000808) (0.000880) (0.000435) (0.000202) (0.000222) (0.000963) (6.56e-06)
Log-Likelihood 47.02296 20.10015 146.1234 44.82197 28.55698 24.33469 18.36155 25.91195 20.27358 1.062379 -3.28089 6.530787 14.66743 20.44522 0.889112 13.46514
AICᴬ -80.0459 -22.2003 -274.247 -69.6439 -41.114 -22.6694 -12.7231 -31.8239 -14.5472 27.87524 32.56177 10.93843 -5.33485 -16.8905 18.22178 -4.93029
BIC ᴮ -66.9475 -5.3595 -257.406 -50.9319 -26.1444 1.656237 9.731304 -13.1119 9.778461 55.94326 56.88739 33.39284 17.11956 5.563964 36.93379 15.65292
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates presented are conditional partial effects. See Wooldridge (2002, p.527).
ᴬ Alkaike Information Criterion 
ᴮ Bayesian Information Criterion 
Table A.1: Continued
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